Ordinary people, much less international sellers, find it difficult to understand, control, or carry out these operations, which are currently governed by the DAP 2020.
Many foreign armament suppliers had parachuted into India after being attracted by the country’s increased military spending and associated drive to produce defence equipment domestically. However, many of their landings have proven to be difficult and violent since the Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan, or self-sufficiency slogan, has replaced the earlier “Make in India” initiative as the new refrain for achieving self-reliance in defence manufacturing.
It is understandable why many of these foreign firms resemble the bewildered seven-year-old Alice from the apocryphal fantasy story of the same name from the nineteenth century, who wanders aimlessly through a garden party in anticipation of the white rabbit’s miraculous appearance to guide them to the fabled Wonderland of India’s enormous and thriving arms market.
However, as they traverse the deep maw of the Ministry of Defence (MoD’s bureaucracy, )’s its quirks, and overblown sense of importance, their illusions and make-believe are quickly dashed. This can take years at a time. An realistic comparison of India’s defence procurement processes to the well-known children’s game Snakes and Ladders was made by a former chief of staff of the Indian Army.
It is understandable why many of these foreign firms resemble the bewildered seven-year-old Alice from the apocryphal fantasy story of the same name from the nineteenth century, who wanders aimlessly through a garden party in anticipation of the white rabbit’s miraculous appearance to guide them to the fabled Wonderland of India’s enormous and thriving arms market.
However, as they traverse the deep maw of the Ministry of Defence (MoDbureaucracy, )’s its quirks, and overblown sense of importance, their illusions and make-believe are quickly dashed. This can take years at a time. An realistic comparison of India’s defence procurement processes to the well-known children’s game Snakes and Ladders was made by a former chief of staff of the Indian Army.
General V.K. Singh claimed in 2012 that, like the numerous counters that slid quickly down the board in Snakes and Ladders after a dice roll, all paperwork pertaining to military purchases always reverted to the beginning from the top just when the end appeared nigh.
Sadly, not much has changed in the past ten years.
Contrarily, these procedures—now governed by the MoD’s 657-page Defence Acquisition Procedure, 2020 (DAP 2020)—have grown even more complicated, filled with frequent revisions and exceptions, and challenging for regular people, much less foreign vendors, to either understand, manage, or carry out.
Because this monumental document, which governs capital purchases by all three services, prompts the question, “What about the acquisition policy, or are India’s military procurements only governed by the muddled procedures?” The DAP 2020, which went into effect in October of that year, is a dense and complex mixture of policy and procedure, strengthened by official “precedents” and greatly varying interpretations of the legalese, in keeping with the hybrid legal system India practises. The answer is therefore complicated as one might expect.
Oh, come on, the majority would reply, that’s just nitpicking. What damage, after all, does it do if policy and practise are combined? No, theoretically. But while policies must be unyielding and firm throughout time, processes must be adaptable in order to fulfil the original intent behind their creation. However, when they are combined, as they are in DAP 2020, the eighth “updated” procurement manual in the last twenty years, India’s risk-averse bureaucracy elevates processes to the status of policy, making them completely rigid and intransigent.
In a nutshell, this intertwined idea of policy-cum-procedure, or bureaucratic “jalebi,” continues to be the enemy of the MoD’s decision-making process and the death knell of numerous material acquisition programmes, both of which have had a negative influence on India’s long-delayed military modernization. Playing things safe is always the goal, though to be fair, given the circumstances, it is somewhat understandable considering that even the smallest mistake runs the risk of being exposed by rivals, if not the government watchdogs, with disastrous results.
With exceptions, many vendors operating in India are frequently driven to the verge of despair when attempting to interact with the civilian and military bureaucracy in South Block and the neighbouring “Bhawans” and hutments housing various Service Headquarters and their respective Directorates. These vendors are accustomed to straightforward dealings and relatively more flexible and consultative business cultures in their respective countries. It can be a gruesome experience inside these unassuming buildings, occasionally bordering on the cathartic, to express one’s viewpoint, get information, or settle a dispute without being talked down to by the officials.
To put it mildly, the overall experience is memorable.
First of all, getting the attention of the perpetually busy “concerned” defence officials is difficult and frequently necessitates asking for favours. But having somehow obtained access, these interactions are, in most circumstances, confusing. Because the hapless vendors are constantly bombarded with bombastic and endless stories about the “wonderful” qualities of DAP 2020 and the various “reforms” implemented by the government to enhance commercial comfort.
The lengthy explanations on the impressive domestic defence engineering capabilities and the rising domestic material exports, which currently make up 0.2% of all international arms exports, are sure to put the audience to sleep.
In these multi-tiered decision-making mazes, every official has a different idea of what is required and what the vendors should actually be expected to deliver. The latter are also bluntly informed that, in accordance with the MoD’s constantly shifting equipment goalposts, they would be required to transfer cutting-edge technology to domestic Indian companies without question while also bearing responsibility for the finished product, though without giving them any control over the manufacturing agency. All vendor suggestions—many of which are the result of their extensive expertise carrying out defence contracts across the globe—are categorically rejected as being trivial, unimportant, or unnecessary in the Indian context.
Few vendors challenge the MoD’s viewpoints, even at the risk of losing lucrative contracts and adhering to the maxim that the customer is always right. This is true even at the risk of losing out to Indian firms, which are increasingly taking the title of “prime vendors” for the majority of domestic defence contracts. Anyone who questions or even somewhat disagrees with their interlocutors is instantly “taught” about the benefits of “co-development and co-production,” frequently in hectoring or patronising tones depending on the situation. The unspoken rule of India’s unfailing bureaucracy, “Be reasonable, do it my way,” supersedes reason and prudence.
When these “senior officials” feel cornered by an uncomfortable question during a seminar or roundtable discussion, they occasionally respond straight-facedly by saying there is no “immediate solution,” it was a bigger problem that needed “due consideration,” or they play the ultimate trump card and say, “It was a good point,” and leave it at that. On the other hand, several less senior officials acknowledge that the relevant question was simply “beyond their pay grade” and required additional consideration at a “higher level.”
Potential vendors should perhaps heed Albert Einstein’s advice in their dealings: If your head tells you one thing and your heart tells you another, before you follow either, decide whether you have a better head or a better heart. India’s military equipment needs are unavoidable, but weary of its three Ps – (acquisition) personnel, policies, and procedures.
If that causes a problem, the other option is to suspend faith when interacting with the civil and military bureaucracy of the Indian MoD and adhere to Oliver Cromwell’s dictum: “Trust in God, but keep your powder dry.”